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The Unnecessary Harshness of Automatic Waiver
for Failure to File a Timely Concise Statement of
Matters Complained of on Appeal
Robert M. Gorman'
Ten years ago, Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925 was a sleepy
backwater of appellate practice. Since then, Rule 1925 has become
a "hot zone" of litigation and a central focus of many appellate
opinions. This is true despite the fact that the text of Rule 1925
has remained unchanged. What has changed is the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Rule.
The court significantly altered the meaning and significance of
the Rule in two phases. First, in 1998, the court announced Com-
monwealth v. Lord.2 In December 2005, the court re-affirmed and
strengthened the Lord decision in Commonwealth v. Castillo.3 In
this article, I will examine the effect of Lord and Castillo on Rule
1925, and on Pennsylvania appellate practice in general.
Rule 1925 reads in pertinent part as follows:
Opinion in Support of Order
(a) General Rule. Upon receipt of the notice of appeal
the judge who entered the order appealed from, if the rea-
sons for the order do not already appear of record, shall
forthwith file of record at least a brief statement, in the
form of an opinion, of the reasons for the order, or for the
rulings or other matters complained of, or shall specify in
writing the place in the record where such reasons may be
found.
(b) Direction to file statement of matters com-
plained of. The lower court forthwith may enter an or-
der directing the Appellant to file of record in the lower
court and serve on the trial judge a concise statement of
1. The author is a law clerk for ajudge on the Pennsylvania Superior Court. The views
expressed in this piece are those of the author, and not necessarily those of any member of
the court.
2. 719 A.2d 306 (Pa. 1998).
3. 888 A.2d 775 (Pa. 2005).
443
Duquesne Law Review
the matters complained of on appeal no later than 14 days
after entry of such order. A failure to comply with such
direction may be considered by the appellate court as a
waiver of all objections to the order, ruling, or other mat-
ter complained of.
4
The mechanics of Rule 1925 are relatively straightforward. Rule
1925 comes into play only after a party (the "appellant") has filed a
notice of appeal from a judgment or order of the trial court. After
the appellant files the notice of appeal, the trial court has the op-
tion of ordering the appellant to file a concise statement of matters
complained of on appeal ("concise statement"). The concise state-
ment is meant to be a list of all of the issues that the appellant will
raise on appeal. After the trial court reads the concise statement,
the court can write a Rule 1925 opinion explaining why the court
ruled as it did on all of the appellant's issues. The court will then
file its opinion in the trial court record. At that point, the entire
trial court record is compiled and transferred to the superior court
for disposition.
The salutary purpose of Rule 1925 is to provide the appellate
court with an opinion which explains the trial court's reasoning on
the specific issues that the appellant will raise on appeal.5 Indeed,
superior court judges and clerks often find it quite helpful to have
a Rule 1925 opinion. Often, the reasons for a trial court's ruling
are not apparent from the record. For example, the court may
grant or overrule an evidentiary objection during trial, without
explanation. Rule 1925 allows the trial court an opportunity to
review the case as a whole, review its own orders, and thoughtfully
explain its reasoning after the "heat of battle" has subsided and
the case is complete.
It should be obvious that when the appellant fails to file a con-
cise statement, he deprives the trial court of that critical list of is-
sues that will be raised on appeal. In so doing, the appellant might
ultimately deprive the appellate court of a meaningful Rule 1925
opinion. Thus, Rule 1925 contains a waiver provision in order to
ensure compliance. The waiver provision states, in pertinent part:
"A failure to comply with such direction may be considered by the
4. PA. R.A.P. 1925.
5. Lord, 719 A.2d at 308 ("The absence of a trial court opinion poses a substantial
impediment to meaningful and effective appellate review. Rule 1925 is intended to aid trial
judges in identifying and focusing upon those issues which the parties plan to raise on ap-
peal. Rule 1925 is thus a crucial component of the appellate process.").
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appellate court as a waiver of all objections to the order, ruling, or
other matter complained of."
Prior to 1998, the superior court found waiver where an appel-
lant's failure to file a concise statement did in fact impair meaning-
ful appellate review.7 The decision to find waiver was at the dis-
cretion of the superior court.8 In other words, the court decided
whether to impose the waiver penalty on a flexible, case-by-case
basis.9
In October 1998, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court unexpectedly
changed Rule 1925 from a discretionary rule to a mandatory rule.10
After explaining that "Rule 1925 is thus a crucial component of the
appellate process,"1 the court held that "from this date [October
28, 1998] forward, in order to preserve their claims for appellate
6. PA. R.A.P. 1925(b) (emphasis added).
7. See Commonwealth v. Butler, 812 A.2d 631, 632-33 (Pa. 2002) (citations omitted).
8. Butler, 812 A.2d at 632-33.
9. Id.
10. The underlying superior court decision in Lord was an unpublished memorandum.
Commonwealth v. Lord, 664 A.2d 1057 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). When the supreme court
granted a petition for allowance of appeal, the court stated that its review would be limited
to the following question: "Have the recent amendments to Pa.R.Crim. P. No. 1410 [making
post-sentence motions optional] precluded an appellate court from asserting the waiver of
an appellate issue for the reason that the issue was omitted from the Statement of Matters
Complained of on Appeal?" Commonwealth v. Lord, 670 A.2d 640 (Pa. 1996).
In Lord, the supreme court attempted to resolve an apparent conflict among differ-
ent superior court panels on the question of whether parties were required to include all of
their issues in a concise statement, under penalty of waiver. Certain superior court panels
had held that including all issues in a concise statement was unnecessary, in light of the
fact that newly-enacted Rule of Criminal Procedure 1410 made post-sentence motions op-
tional. Lord, 719 A.2d at 308 (citing Commonwealth v. Cortes, 659 A.2d 573 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995)). Other panels, such as the superior court panel in Lord itself, held that failing to
include an issue in a concise statement renders the claim waived because the absence of an
opinion on that issue hampered appellate review. See Lord, 719 A.2d at 307. Arguably
there was no actual conflict between these superior court panels, because in each case the
superior court made its waiver decision based on an individualized, case-by-case determina-
tion of whether the absence of an opinion hampered appellate review.
It is also arguable that Lord's automatic waiver rule was unnecessary, because the
superior court is always in the best position to determine whether (or to what extent) non-
compliance with Rule 1925 hampers effective review on a case-by-case basis. For example,
assume that a criminal defendant moves for suppression, and the trial court denies the
motion in a lengthy and scholarly opinion. The case then goes to trial, where the defendant
is ultimately convicted. The defendant appeals, and seeks to raise the suppression claim on
appeal. Before Lord, if the defendant failed to include the suppression claim in his concise
statement, the superior court may not have found waiver because the court understood the
suppression court's reasoning. After Lord, if the defendant failed to include the suppression
claim in his concise statement, the suppression issue is waived automatically, even if the
court's appellate review is not actually hampered. Moreover, as a practical matter, appel-
late courts always have the authority to remand for a Rule 1925 opinion if the existing opin-
ion is inadequate. See Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 868 A.2d 379, 383-384 (Pa. 2005).
11. Lord, 719 A.2d at 308 (emphasis added).
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review, Appellants must comply whenever the trial court orders
them to file a Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal pur-
suant to Rule 1925. Any issues not raised in a 1925(b) statement
will be deemed waived."
1 2
Through that holding, by judicial fiat, the court fundamentally
changed the substance of Rule 1925." As the court itself recog-
nized, Lord "eliminated any aspect of discretion and established a
bright-line rule for waiver under Rule 1925[.]" 14 "Thus, waiver un-
der Rule 1925 is automatic.""
While the waiver rule in Lord was clear and unambiguous,
courts still struggled with the question of whether to find waiver
under various factual circumstances." One of the most common
scenarios arose in Commonwealth v. Ortiz.7 In that case, the ap-
pellant filed his concise statement untimely (two weeks beyond the
14-day deadline set forth in the Rule). 8 The trial court overlooked
the untimeliness of the concise statement, and issued a Rule 1925
opinion thereon. 9 On appeal, the superior court chose not to find
waiver, because the underlying purpose of the rule had been
served.2 °
Over the years, the superior court routinely cited Ortiz as an ex-
ception to Lord's strict waiver rule.2' Over time, the superior court
developed a rule that where an appellant files an untimely concise
12. Id. at 309.
13. Again, the text of the rule itself remains unchanged. See Butler, 812 A.2d at 635
(Castille, J., concurring). The court certainly has the power to amend the text of the rule to
align it with Lord. In Pennsylvania, the supreme court has the exclusive authority to
promulgate Rules of Civil, Criminal, and Appellate Procedure. PA. CONST. art. V § 10(c).
Rule 1925 provides the single clearest example of the proposition that practitioners who
read a rule but ignore judicial interpretations thereof do so at their own risk.
14. Butler, 812 A.2d at 633.
15. Id. Butler expressly applied the Lord waiver rule to proceedings under the Post
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9541-9546. Butler also held that
because waiver was "automatic," the superior court could find waiver sua sponte. In other
words, the superior court can (and often does) find waiver under Lord even where the appel-
lee makes no argument on the issue.
16. See, e.g., Everett Cash Mut. Ins. Co. v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 804 A.2d 31 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2002) (applying waiver rule where appellant may have served the Concise Statement on the
trial judge, but failed to file it as part of the certified record); Commonwealth v. Alsop, 799
A.2d 129 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (en banc) (applying waiver rule even when the trial court
correctly guesses the issue to be raised on appeal, and includes an opinion thereon in its
Rule 1925 opinion); Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778 A.2d 683, 686-687 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001)
(applying waiver rule to vague concise statements).
17. 745 A.2d 662 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
18. Ortiz, 745 A.2d at 663 n.3.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sohlneiter, 884 A.2d 307 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
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statement, he risks waiver under Lord, depending on whether or
not the trial court chose to enforce the 14-day deadline. Specifi-
cally, if the trial court overlooked the untimeliness and wrote an
opinion, no waiver would result because appellate review would
not be hampered.23 However, if the trial court enforced the dead-
line and refused to write an opinion because the concise statement
was late, waiver would result.24
The Pennsylvania Superior Court's adoption of that flexible ap-
proach did not go unnoticed by the supreme court. In August 2004,
the supreme court granted allocatur in Commonwealth v. Casti-
llo,25 to decide whether to permit such an approach.26 On December
29, 2005, the court issued its ruling. The supreme court soundly
rejected the superior court's approach, re-asserted the bright-line
waiver rule of Lord, and applied it to untimely concise state-
ments.27
The Castillo court's rationale was based almost exclusively on
the perceived need for clarity, simplicity, and uniformity. In re-
sponse to the Philadelphia Defender's Association's argument for a
lenient and flexible approach, the court wrote:
The Defenders Association, however, fails to provide a so-
lution for the problems caused by inconsistent application
of discretion which plagued the system prior to Lord and
22. In re D.H., 863 A.2d 562, 565 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
23. Id.
24. Id. In Commonwealth v. Smith, 854 A.2d 597, 600 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004), the trial
court found waiver because the appellant's concise statement was late. However, the trial
court issued a substantive opinion "in the alternative." Smith, 854 A.2d at 600 The supe-
rior court chose to find waiver, reasoning as follows: "The [trial] court addressed Appellant's
issue in the alternative not because Appellant had preserved the issue for review but only
on the possibility that we would override its decision to reject the late filing, which we de-
cline to do." Id.
25. 858 A.2d 1156 (Pa. 2004).
26. See also Commonwealth v. Schofield, 888 A.2d 771 (Pa. 2005) (deciding the merits in
a companion case); Commonwealth v. Schofield, 858 A.2d 1157 (Pa. 2004) (granting alloca-
tur in companion case). In Schofield, a pro se appellant served her concise statement on the
trial judge, but she did not file it with the prothonotary. As a result, the concise statement
did not appear in the certified record transmitted to the appellate courts. The trial court
opinion did not indicate when the appellant served the concise statement, nor did it ex-
pressly list all of the issues that the appellant raised therein. After granting allocatur, the
supreme court ruled that the appellant's issues were waived because she failed to comply
with the "minimal requirements" of serving and filing the concise statement within 14 days.
Commonwealth v. Schofield, 888 A.2d 771, 773-774 (Pa. 2005). For ease of reference, I will
refer primarily to Castillo.
27. Castillo, 888 A.2d at 780 (expressly disapproving of Ortiz and "prior decisions of the
intermediate courts to the extent they have created exceptions to Lord and have addressed
issues that should have been deemed waived.").
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Butler. Even in arguing for relaxation of the rule, the As-
sociation demonstrates the potential for inconsistent re-
sults in its exposition of the permutations of non-
compliance, where it suggests the certain kinds of non-
compliance might justify waiver and others should not,
depending on a fact-specific determination of the suffi-
ciency of the record. In so doing, the Association reinforces
the need for a bright-line rule to provide litigants and
courts with clarity and certainty. The bench and bar un-
der the Lord/Butler rule are not left to ponder whether
the record sufficiently allows the appellate court to glean
the trial court's rationale, either from a filed Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) opinion or elsewhere in the record. Moreover,
Courts are not forced to ascertain whether an explication
of the trial court's rationale is unnecessary for appellate
review. To hold otherwise is to turn back the clock to a
time of inconsistent results and uneven justice.
In the same vein, while the Association suggests that
some degree of untimeliness does not hinder the trial
court or the appellate court when the trial court obtains
the Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement prior to drafting its opin-
ion, the question remains as to how long is too long. Al-
lowing for discretion regarding timeliness will result in
inconsistencies. For example, when faced with the lack of
a timely Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, one trial court
might file quickly and efficiently an opinion waiving all
issues, while another might address the issues it believes
the appellant will raise, and still another might delay fil-
ing an opinion until a statement is received. If the appel-
lant in each hypothetical case eventually files an equally
untimely statement, the appellate court in the first case
would waive the issues that the trial court waived, while
in the second two scenarios, under current Superior Court
precedent, the appellate court could address the issues so
long as the trial court addressed the same issues in its
opinion. As a result, the same factual situation could pro-
duce diametrically opposed results depending on how
quickly a trial court files its opinion after the expiration of
the Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) filing period. As referenced above,
we decline to adopt a position which will yield unsupport-
able distinctions between similarly situated litigants.
448 Vol. 44
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Thus, the Lord/Butler rule remains necessary to insure
trial judges in each appealed case the opportunity to opine
upon the issues which the appellant intends to raise, and
thus provide appellate courts with records amendable to
meaningful appellate review. See Lord, 719 A.2d at 308.
This firm rule avoids the situation that existed prior to
Lord where trial courts were forced to anticipate which is-
sues the appellant might raise and appellate courts had to
determine "whether they could conduct a 'meaningful re-
view' despite an appellant's failure to file a Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) statement or to include certain issues within a
filed statement." Butler, 812 A.2d at 633. Moreover, the
system provides litigants with clear rules regarding what
is necessary for compliance and certainty of result for
failure to comply.28
While the Castillo rule has the benefit of simplicity and clarity,
it is flawed in other respects.
First, in this author's opinion, Castillo addressed a largely non-
existent problem. There is no evidence that justice was not served
by the existing rule, which conditioned waiver on whether the trial
court chose to overlook the timeliness of the concise statement.
Under prior practice, if the trial court chose to enforce the rule,
then the appellant was appropriately penalized for non-
compliance. Similarly, if the trial court chose to overlook the un-
timeliness, then the case could proceed because the appellate court
obtained a meaningful trial court opinion. There was nothing par-
ticularly arbitrary, unfair, or confusing about that system.29 It con-
tained a serious risk of penalty for noncompliance, while retaining
an essential measure of flexibility. While it may be true that simi-
larly-situated appellants could be treated differently, this is no
different from any other area of legal practice where the court has
the discretion to enforce deadlines.
Second, Castillo will often create results which are inconsistent
with the underlying purpose of Rule 1925 and Lord itself. Again,
28. Id. at 779-80.
29. At least one court in dicta has stated: "The rationale for [the Castillo rule] is plain:
whether an appellate court reviews an issue cannot be based on the conduct, decision or
whim of the trial court; rather, it must be based on the actions of the appellant in properly
preserving issues for review." Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Wapner, 903 A.2d 565, 573 n.7
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
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the stated purpose of the Rule and Lord is to ensure that the ap-
pellate court receives a helpful trial court opinion. In cases such as
Ortiz, the trial court wrote an opinion on the very issues that the
appellant raised in his concise statement. The Castillo rule would
find waiver simply because the concise statement happened to be
untimely. Such a result needlessly elevates form over substance.
Indeed, Castillo's inflexibility is patently inconsistent with
Pa.R.A.P. 105(a), which provides that the Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure "shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every matter to which they are appli-
cable." Rules 105(a) and 105(b) allow an intermediate appellate
court to relax or disregard most rules of appellate procedure, in-
cluding filing deadlines, in the interest of justice. The only stated
exception to this general rule is found in Rule 105(b), which states
that appellate courts may not enlarge "the time for filing a notice
of appeal, a petition for allowance of appeal, a petition for permis-
sion to appeal, or a petition for review.""° Perhaps the supreme
court should also re-write Rule 105 to clarify that after Castillo,
appellate courts may no longer extend the time for filing concise
statements in the interest of expediency and justice.
Finally, the waiver rule is extraordinarily harsh. Waiver will
result in dismissal of the entire case, without any disposition on
the merits. This is true even if the appellant consistently raised
the substantive claim at trial and in post-trial or post-sentence
motions. It is also true if the record contains a trial court opinion
on the issue at hand (e.g., a suppression opinion or a Rule 1925
opinion).
The Castillo court does recognize the harshness of the rule, but
notes "that the harshness is alleviated by the ability of criminal
defendants to seek relief by challenging the effectiveness of their
counsel and civil defendants to file malpractice actions."3 It is true
that criminal defendants are able to challenge their counsel's inef-
fectiveness through the PCRA."2 Indeed, our supreme court has
essentially held that relief is guaranteed, because prejudice is pre-
30. See also PA. R.A.P. 903 and official note thereto. The timely filing of a notice of
appeal affects the jurisdiction of the Superior Court to hear a case. See, e.g., Commonwealth
v. Dreves, 839 A.2d 1122, 1126 n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (en banc); Morningstar v. Hoban,
819 A.2d 1191, 1194 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). The timely filing of a concise statement certainly
does not implicate such jurisdictional concerns.
31. 888 A.2d at 780.
32. Commonwealth v. Halley, 870 A.2d 795, 800 (Pa. 2005).
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sumed when counsel fails to file a concise statement.33  On the
other hand, the prospect of relief may be of little comfort to an in-
dividual who may have to remain in jail for up to a year or more
before regaining his or her direct appeal rights. Moreover, in the
highly unfortunate event that PCRA counsel fails to raise counsel's
ineffectiveness for failing to comply with Castillo, chances are re-
mote that the petitioner will be able to revive that issue in a sub-
sequent PCRA petition. This is so because of the strict jurisdic-
tional one-year time limit on filing PCRA petitions.34 One must
assume, however, that nearly every case of waiver under Castillo
will simply result in the case being processed through the PCRA.
After that laborious and arguably unnecessary process," the case
will be essentially reinstated to the superior court at the point be-
fore the Castillo waiver occurred. Assuming, as we must, that
Castillo does result in an increase in collateral proceedings, one
must wonder whether the net burden on our judicial system will
outweigh any benefit from the clarity of the Castillo rule itself.
The effect of Castillo on civil litigants is equally harsh. In the
civil arena, there is no simple mechanism in the trial court or ap-
pellate courts for reviving issues that have been waived on appeal.
Rather, a litigant who has his or her issues waived under Castillo
will have to file a malpractice claim against prior counsel. In order
to succeed in a malpractice claim, the plaintiff must establish a
"case within a case" - in other words, the plaintiff must establish
that counsel was negligent and that the underlying action (here,
the appeal) would have been successful.36 Merely describing that
process suggests how expensive and cumbersome it would be.
Castillo's strict waiver rule would have a uniquely prejudicial ef-
fect on family-law appeals involving child custody. Such appeals
are particularly time-sensitive for obvious reasons. The superior
33. Halley, 870 A.2d at 800. The Halley court did not state that prejudice is presumed
when counsel files a statement but neglects to include an issue. The Halley court also did
not state that prejudice is presumed when counsel files a late concise statement. Given the
court's recent announcement in Castillo, however, it is fair to assume that prejudice would
now be presumed when counsel files the statement late. Under Castillo, filing the state-
ment late is the functional equivalent of not filing it at all, because waiver is now automatic
and absolute in both scenarios.
34. For a thorough discussion of how the PCRA's strict time limitations preclude a court
from granting relief even where multiple counsel have committed patently obvious and
prejudicial errors, see Commonwealth v. Bennett, 842 A.2d 953 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (en
banc).
35. See Commonwealth v. West, 883 A.2d 654 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005), discussed infra at n.
45.
36. Myers v. Robert Lewis Seigle, P.C., 751 A.2d 1182, 1184 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
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court, in fact, has a "fast-track" program for processing custody
appeals as quickly as possible. If the issues in a custody appeal
are deemed waived under Castillo, those issues will be waived for
the foreseeable future, even when the best interests of the child
would call for reversing the decision of the trial court.
One particularly questionable aspect of the Castillo rule is that
it can produce waiver even when an appellant supplies a concise
statement to the trial court within 14 days. For example, it is ap-
parently the traditional practice in certain Pennsylvania counties
for a litigant to "file" a concise statement by simply serv-
ing/handing it to the judge in chambers. This practice, however,
does not comport with the rule in Butler, Castillo, and Schofield
that the concise statement must be actually filed (i.e., submitted
and time-stamped) with the prothonotary/clerk of courts. Thus, it
is easy to imagine a scenario where the appellant hands his concise
statement to the trial judge in a timely fashion, but fails to actu-
ally file the document within 14 days. Even though the court re-
ceived the concise statement on time and used it to write a mean-
ingful opinion for the appellate court, the issues would still be
waived under Castillo. In this scenario, nearly all relevant aspects
of Rule 1925 would be satisfied, except for the ministerial act of
filing. One must conclude that according to the supreme court, the
value of uniformity and predictability has in many ways out-
stripped the original stated value of the rule, which was to facili-
tate meaningful appellate review.
Of course, the Castillo rule is hardly the only rule calling for
waiver. On the other hand, the harsh effects of waiver are usually
justified by institutional and systemic concerns. For example, ap-
pellate courts find waiver where the appellant has failed to raise
an issue in the trial court, because of the strong public policy rea-
sons supporting the idea that trial proceedings should not be a
mere "dress rehearsal" for a later appeal."8 Appellate courts also
find waiver where a litigant has failed to develop adequately an
37. Yet another recurrent problem under Castillo arises where: (1) counsel files an
untimely concise statement; (2) the superior court dismisses the appeal, finding all issues
waived under Castillo; (3) counsel files a petition for reconsideration, alleging that he re-
ceived informal assurances from the trial judge or the judge's law clerk that counsel could
file the concise statement by an extended deadline; and (4) this alleged assurance is found
nowhere in the certified record. In Commonwealth v. Woods, 909 A.2d 372 (Pa. Super.
2006), the court recently held that extensions of time are permissible, but only if they are
requested and granted through formal petitions and orders on the record.
38. PA- R.A.P. 302(a); Straub v. Cherne Indus., 880 A.2d 561, 566 (Pa. 2005) (citing
Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 322 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1974)).
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argument through citation to the law or legal authority because
under such circumstances meaningful appellate review is truly
limited.39 As noted above, however, the problems associated with
an untimely concise statement do not rise to the level at which
courts should impose waiver so inflexibly. °
Castillo is only the most recent example of cases where the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has struck down the superior court's
attempts to create or recognize equitable exceptions to general
rules. This recent trend began in the PCRA arena, where the court
consistently struck down the superior court's attempts to create
equitable exceptions to the PCRA's strict timeliness require-
ments.41
The trend has continued with the supreme court's own general
rules. In Commonwealth v. Grant" the supreme court announced
a general rule that claims of ineffectiveness should be deferred to
the PCRA. In Commonwealth v. Salisbury,' the superior court
attempted to recognize an equitable "short sentence" exception to
this rule. In Commonwealth v. O'Berg," the supreme court struck
down this equitable exception. Moreover, the court "[took] this
opportunity to disapprove of any decisions of the superior court
that [create exceptions to the general rule]") (emphasis added).
Approximately three weeks after O'Berg was decided, the supe-
rior court recognized (at its own peril) another exception to the
Grant rule.4" In West, the superior court began with the recognition
that where counsel fails to file a Concise Statement, resulting in
waiver of all claims, prejudice is presumed under recent supreme
court precedent. 46 The West court then reasoned as follows:
Under the reasoning of Halley, counsel's unjustified fail-
ure to file a Concise Statement represents a complete or
39. See PA.R.A.P. 2119; Commonwealth v. Alsop, 799 A.2d 129, 135 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2001).
40. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has recognized that waiver under Castillo will not
take place if the trial court failed to provide proper notice of the Rule 1925 order directing
the Appellant to file a concise statement. Commonwealth v. Hart, 2006 PA Super 324.
41. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157 (Pa. 2003) (striking down the Supe-
rior Court's equitable "relation back" doctrine exception); Commonwealth v. Hall, 771 A.2d
1232 (Pa. 2001) (rejecting Superior Court's theory that reinstatement of appellate rights
nunc pro tunc is an equitable exception to the PCRA's strict time limitations).
42. 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002).
43. 823 A.2d 914 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
44. 880 A.2d 597, 602 (Pa. 2005).
45. See Commonwealth v. West, 883 A.2d 654 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
46. Id. at 657 (citing Commonwealth v. Halley, 870 A.2d 795, 800 (Pa. 2005)).
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constructive denial of counsel, where prejudice is pre-
sumed. Under Grant, such a clear-cut claim may be
heard on direct appeal, rather than be deferred to the
PCRA. Given the decision in Halley, it would be a point-
less exercise to defer this claim to the PCRA for an ex-
amination of the traditional three-pronged ineffectiveness
test. Thus, we will not defer Appellant's ineffectiveness
claim to the PCRA.47
The West court held that the appropriate remedy for failure to
file a concise statement would be an immediate remand for counsel
to file a concise statement.4. The supreme court recently denied
allocatur in West.49 West would have provided the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court with an opportunity to examine the complex inter-
play between the its newly-announced strict general rules in cases
such as Lord, Grant, O'Berg, Halley, and, now, Castillo.50
In my view, the next "frontier" of waiver under Rule 1925 will be
the area of vague concise statements. Rule 1925 itself does not set
forth the form of a concise statement, other than to say that: (1) it
must list the issues to be raised on appeal; and (2) it must be "con-
cise." In Dowling, the superior court held that a concise statement
which is too vague to identify the issues that the appellant will be
actually raise on appeal "is the functional equivalent of no concise
statement at all."51  Recently, in Commonwealth v. Reeves," the
superior court provided the following guidance:
There is a common sense obligation to give the trial
court notice as to what the trial court should address
in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. While there is a mid-
dle ground that counsel must travel to avoid having a
Rule 1925(b) statement so vague that the trial judge
cannot ascertain what issues should be discussed in
47. West, 883 A.2d at 657.
48. Id. at 658.
49. 903 A.2d 538 (Pa. 2006).
50. Even more vexing is the question of how to manage those principles where counsel
petitions to withdraw from representation on direct appeal pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967). See Commonwealth v. Myers, 897 A.2d 493 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (fol-
lowing West and Halley, and remanding for additional Rule 1925 procedures where counsel
seeks to withdraw but failed to file a concise statement); Commonwealth v. Flores, 909 A.2d
387 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (remanding for additional Rule 1925 procedures where counsel
seeks to withdraw, but filed a vague and incomplete concise statement).
51. Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778 A.2d 683,686-87 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
52. 907 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
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the Rule 1925(a) opinion or so verbose and lengthy
that it frustrates the ability of the trial judge to hone
in on the issues actually being presented to the appel-
late court, see Kanter v. Epstein, 2004 PA Super 470,
866 A.2d 394 (Pa. Super. 2004), that is not an onerous
burden to place on counsel. It only requires using a
little common sense.
The Rule 1925(b) statement must be detailed
enough so that the judge can write a Rule 1925(a)
opinion, but not so lengthy that it does not meet the
goal of narrowing down the issues previously raised
to the few that are likely to be presented to the appel-
late court without giving the trial judge volumes to
plow through.53
Overbroad concise statements raise similar problems to vague
concise statements. For example, assume that a criminal defen-
dant is convicted of 12 different charges. A concise statement al-
leging simply that the evidence was generally insufficient to sup-
port the jury's verdict would most likely be too vague." Such a
statement does not help the court focus on any particular charge,
or any particular deficiency in the evidence.55 Similarly, in a
lengthy civil case, an appellant may not simply claim that the
court erred in its evidentiary decisions, without being more precise
about the specific decision to be challenged on appeal. If the appel-
lant than raises a highly specific complaint on appeal, the chances
are good that the trial court will not have addressed it, because the
concise statement did not notify the court that the Appellant would
raise that specific claim.
Occasionally, trial courts will decline to issue a Rule 1925 opin-
ion on the ground that the concise statement is too vague to pro-
vide for a meaningful response. It is often true that the concise
statements about which the courts complain are indeed too vague.
On the other hand, appellants sometimes counter that the trial
court is simply being disingenuous, complaining about vagueness
when in fact the issue was perfectly clear. At present, this issue is
being handled on an ad hoc basis in the superior court. It is diffi-
53. Id. at 2-3.
54. Commonwealth v. Lemon, 804 A.2d 34, 37 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
55. Lemon, 804 A.2d at 37.
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cult to predict whether, or when, the supreme court will address it.
Moreover, that issue does legitimately affect meaningful appellate
review, because it affects the quality of the trial court's opinion.
As written, the text of Rule 1925 is wildly at odds with a series
of increasingly strict supreme court decisions interpreting that
rule. Moreover, in the year since Castillo was published, it has
been the subject of sustained criticism among appellate practitio-
56ners.
Perhaps in response to this criticism, the Pennsylvania Appel-
late Court Procedural Rules Committee has proposed extensive
revisions to both the text of Rule 1925 and its supporting official
notes. These proposals have been the subject of public comment,
and are now being considered by the supreme court. While it is
beyond the scope of this article to set forth the proposed amend-
ments in detail, the most important proposals are as follows.
First, subsection (b) would be expanded to explain precisely how,
where, and when to file and serve the concise statement. Subsec-
tion (b)(2) would provide a deadline of 21 days from the date of the
court's order. The court could also enlarge the time for filing or
allow a supplemental concise statement "for good cause shown." A
court could even cure a party's failure to file by ordering a concise
statement nunc pro tunc "in extraordinary circumstances."
Second, subsection (b)(3) would direct the trial court to provide
the appellant full instructions on how and when to serve the
statement, as well as fair warning that any issue not included
therein "shall be deemed waived."
Third, subsection (b)(4) would require the appellant to identify
"each ruling that the Appellant intends to challenge with sufficient
detail to identify all pertinent issues for the trial judge." (emphasis
added). In other words, the focus would be on the court's rulings,
not on any particular issue. According to proposed subsection
(b)(4)(ii), "each ruling identified in that manner will be deemed to
include every subsidiary issue included therein; any rulings not
included in the statement of errors complained of shall be deemed
waived."
Fourth, subsection (c) would provide a "fallback" procedure in
both civil and criminal cases that could avoid automatic waiver.
Specifically, subsection (c) would allow the superior court to re-
56. See, e.g., Howard J. Bashman, "Pa. Supreme Court Rejects Opportunity To Relax Its
Harsh Appellate Waiver Jurisprudence," reprinted at
http://hjbashman.blogspot.com/2006_02-0lhjbashman~archive.html.
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mand for further Rule 1925 procedures nunc pro tunc, "upon appli-
cation of the appellant and for good cause shown." Thus, criminal
cases would not necessarily be deferred to the PCRA, and civil
cases could go forward as intended, without having to resort to a
malpractice action against defaulting counsel. Subsection (c)
would also explain how new Rule 1925 interplays with Anders pe-
titions to withdraw.
These proposed amendments do more than just rewrite Rule
1925 to reflect current practice. Rather, the proposed amendments
add back an essential measure of "fair warning", flexibility, and
common sense to Rule 1925 procedures. While it is unclear when
and to what extent the supreme court will adopt these amend-
ments, practitioners may reasonably expect that much-needed
Rule 1925 reform is on the horizon.

